# Neighborhood Effects and Trial on the Internet: Evidence from Online Grocery Retailing

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Grocery Store Antitrust: Historical Retrospective and Current Developments May 24, 2007

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# Background

"... choice of a store location has a profound effect ... A bad choice may all but guarantee failure, a good choice, success."

"Store Location: Little Things Mean A Lot" CBSC.

For the Internet retailer, however ...

- Geographical boundary of customer base constrained only by availability of shipping infrastructure
- Multiplicity of competitors and customer options
- $\Rightarrow$  Relevance of interaction?
- $\Rightarrow$  Implications for evolution?

# Background

Empirical distribution of (a) revenue and (b) average value reveals

- California, Texas, Florida, New York generate most revenue
- Interior western states have larger orders
- Observational units: Individuals denoted by i reside in regions denoted by z, may experience an event at t
- Social contagion/neighborhood effect: Local spillovers resulting from (observational) learning and/or direct communication
- Risk set: Group of regions that have yet to experience the event (regions); sum of all individuals over all regions (individuals)

# Background

- Agents' decisions influenced by decisions of others
  - BANERJEE (1992)
  - BIKHCHANDANI, HIRSHLEIFER & WELCH (1992)
- Economic processes may generate spatial patterns
  - CASE, HINES & ROSEN (1993)
  - GOOLSBEE & KLENOW (2002)
- Social networks disseminate information
  - OYEN & DE FLEUR (1953)
  - TOLENAY, DEANE & BECK (1996)
- External information more relevant for "trial"
  - HOWARD & SHETH (1969)
  - URBAN (1975)

### Research Questions and Approach

- 1. Are neighborhood effects present in trial of Internet service?
  - (a) Is the effect identifiable and consistent with rational behavior?
  - (b) If present, what is the economic impact on spacetime diffusion?
  - (c) (Are neighborhood effects absent for repeat?)

# $\Rightarrow$ Approach

- Link statistical theory of hazard to random utility
- Estimate effect with appropriate controls

### Elements and assumptions

ullet Instantaneous probability that event occurs for individual i at time t

$$\lambda(t) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} P(t \le T_{iz} \le t + \Delta | T_{iz} \ge t) / \Delta$$

• The discrete time analog is

$$P_{iz}(t) = P(T_{iz} = t | T_{iz} \ge t, X_{iz}(t))$$

- $-T_{iz}$  is a discrete random variable denoting uncensored time of trial
- Expression is also a conditional probability
- Individual i at location z has an unobserved utility value for trial at t

$$U_{iz}(t) = V_{iz}(t) - \epsilon_{iz}(t)$$

 $\Rightarrow$  Advantages but two serious problems ...

### Elements and assumptions

•  $\epsilon_{iz}(t)$  are iid over individuals and time within region, with pdf

$$f(\epsilon) = \frac{1}{\mu} \exp\left[\frac{\epsilon - \eta}{\mu}\right] \exp\left\{-e^{\frac{\epsilon - \eta}{\mu}}\right\}$$

• Probability that individual i in region z experiences trial at time t is obtained from  $F(\epsilon)$  as

$$P(y_{iz}(t) = 1) = P(\epsilon_{iz}(t) \le V_{iz}(t))$$
$$= 1 - \exp\left\{-\exp\left\{\frac{V_{iz}(t) - \eta}{\mu}\right\}\right\}.$$

• The probability that at least *one* individual tries is

$$P(y_z(t) = 1) = P(\max_i \{ U_{iz}(t) \mid i = 1, \dots, n_z \} \ge 0)$$

$$= P(\max_i \{ V_{iz}(t) - \epsilon_{iz}(t) \} \ge 0)$$

$$= P(V_z(t) - \min_i \{ \epsilon_{iz}(t) \} \ge 0)$$
since we have  $V_{iz}(t) = V_z(t) \ \forall i$ 

$$= P(\min_i \{ \epsilon_{iz}(t) \} \le V_z(t))$$

# Elements and assumptions

• Solution is to define region-specific event — probability that unobserved maximal individual's utility exceeds zero is equivalent to probability that observed deterministic utility  $V_z(t)$  for the representative individual from region exceeds minimum value of all  $\epsilon_{iz}(t)$ 

$$\epsilon_{iz}(t) \sim G(\eta, \mu) 
\epsilon_{z}^{min}(t) = \min_{i} \{ \epsilon_{iz}, i = 1, \dots, n_{z} \} 
\sim G(\eta - \mu \ln(n_{z}), \mu).$$

 $\bullet$  So that probability that trial occurs in region z given that it has not yet occurred is obtained as

$$P(y_z(t) = 1) = F(\epsilon_z^{min}(t))$$

$$= 1 - \exp\left\{-\exp\left\{\frac{V_z(t) - (\eta - \mu \ln(n_z))}{\mu}\right\}\right\}$$

$$= 1 - \exp\left\{-\exp\left\{V_z(t) + \ln(n_z)\right\}\right\}$$

# Neighborhood effects

• Amend deterministic component of region utility

$$V_z'(t) = V_z(t) + \theta[w_z Y_z(t-1)]$$

- Ensure consistency with rational behavior (BROCK & DURLAF 2001)
- Ensure identification no "reflection" (MANSKI 1993)
- One candidate for  $w_z Y_z(t-1)$  is obtained from first order contiguity

### Neighborhood effects

- Lagged expected average choice behavior is a valid representation of social utility (BROCK & DURLAF 2001)
- Identification is possible because relationship between effect and regressors is nonlinear for sufficient variation in neighborhood characteristics
- Implications of reflection
  - True effect if probability of event varies with measure of average probability (behavior) of *exogenous* reference group
  - Contextual effect if probability of trial varies according to the characteristics of the reference group
  - Correlated effect if probability varies due to correlated unobservables

### Summary of properties

- Within Regions. IID utilities, focus on the first trier
- Across Regions. Influence flows across exogenously defined groups
- Rationality. Model is consistent with RUM, no reflection problem
- Other. Gumbel distribution exploited to circumvent lack of individual information; choice of interval length can introduce bias, however complementary log-log model estimates consistent with underlying continuous time process

#### Data

- 1. Disaggregate transaction information
  - Customer identification code
  - Total transaction value
  - 382,478 transactions (05/01/97 through 01/31/01)
  - 162,618 customers
  - 45 discrete time periods

- 2. Supplementary zip code information
  - 29,701 residential zip codes
  - Match to census data for control variables
    - (a) Intrinsic characteristics
    - (b) Household economics
    - (c) Local environment

- 3. CACI retail information
  - Zip code summary of retail presence, sales at convenience, drug, supermarket, w/house stores

- 4. Measure of contagion/neighborhood effect
  - Lagged cumulative effect (LC)
  - Lagged effect (L)

#### **Preliminaries**

- Individuals
  - Average order value \$ 51.53 (SD = \$50.99) [supermarket \$29.80 (SD = \$29.18)]

# • Regions

- 29,701 residential zip codes with 369,146 orders and 156,069 customers
- 1,508 non-residential zip codes with 25,123 orders (eliminated)
- Trial penetration is approximately 60 percent by 01/31/01
- Average number of contiguous neighbors = 5.61 (SD = 2.30), some "islands"
- National Space-Time
- Local Space-Time

#### Results: Initial evidence

- Neigborhood effect only models
  - Show significant effects for all formulations
  - Suggest cumulative approach is best
  - Support distributional assumptions, model structure — coefficient on  $ln(n_z)$  very stable
- But ... is the effect "real"
  - Unobserved common traits
  - Unobserved heterogeneity
  - Endogeneity
  - (Unobserved correlated process)

#### Results: Further evidence

- Expand formulation with
  - Non-parametric time-dependent baseline hazard (heterogeneity)
  - Observed heterogeneity across regions
  - State-level fixed effects (unobserved common traits)
  - State-level mean observables as instruments
  - Internet access, random effect
- After introduction of controls (120 variables),  $\theta$ 
  - Diminishes in magnitude
  - Remains statistically significant
  - Is second most important variable (Wald  $\chi^2$  and standardized coefficients)
  - Holds under alternative formulations for  $n_z$  and  $w_z Y_z(t-1)$


# Results: Substantive implications

- Approximately nineteen percent increase in baseline hazard
  - $\Rightarrow$  Marginal effect of zero to 20,000 neighbors trying, increases focal zip code probability from about 2.7% to 14.0
- Empirical findings
  - (1) Household Characteristics
  - -(2) Household Economics
  - -(3) Local environment
  - -(4) Access to Retail Services

#### Conclusions


- Evidence suggests that neighborhood effects
  - operate on Internet ⇒ social observation/exchange grounded in proximity is important
  - (dissipate when individuals have own information?)
  - (could be exploited through judicious seeding)?
- Discrete time hazard model for continuous time process with an unobserved risk set can be derived to link individuals and regions
- Future research
  - Affiliation based on "socio-demographic proximity" (working paper)
  - Preference minorities (in progress)

# **Total Order Value**




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# Average Order Value per Customer



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# **Average Number of Transactions**



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